Russia retains growing capability in boutique war-fighting areas. That said, Russian President Vladimir Putin's newest missile system is designed to grab American attention far more than it is to advance Russia's nuclear destructive capability.
I note this in light of Russia's apparently successful Avangard hypersonic weapons test on Wednesday. The Avangard is a hypersonic warhead re-entry vehicle that is designed to outpace and outmaneuver U.S. missile defense systems. Announcing that the Avangard will now be deployed with frontline units, Putin pledged that U.S. missile defense systems are now impotent. That's because the Avangard would supposedly allow nuclear warhead re-entry vehicles to escape any kind of U.S. interceptor vehicle. The extension of Putin's confidence is that Russia can now match or overmatch the U.S. in a full-scale nuclear conflict.
But Putin is only half right. While the Avangard is an impressive program that outmatches any hypersonic system in the U.S. military, Russian nuclear targeting, logistics, and strike capabilities remain inferior to America's (although the targeting element is improving). That's largely because Russian fleet ballistic missile submarines are too loud, Russian strategic bomber aircraft are too old, and Russian military professionalism is too unpredictable. In turn, the U.S. would likely be victorious in a nuclear war with Russia, even if the costs of that war to the U.S. civilian population would be utterly horrific.
The Avangard system does allow Putin to send a message to the U.S. that he remains committed to resourcing a near-peer warfighting threat to America. While Putin publicly blames U.S. missile defense systems for his development of Avangard, he knows full well that those defense systems were never a threat to Russia's nuclear capability in the first place. In the event of war, the Russians could overwhelm U.S. defense systems, which are designed to deal with small-scale attacks from evolving nuclear threat actors such as North Korea and Iran). Yet Avangard-type platforms do enable Russia and China (which is also actively developing its own hypersonic reentry vehicle system) to threaten the U.S. in other areas.
Over the next decade expect Moscow and Beijing to use their existing hypersonic technology to develop greater non-nuclear standoff strike capabilities against key U.S. assets such as major military command headquarters or aircraft carriers. The next secretary of defense must demand high-priority returns on investment from U.S. defense contractors working to counter these threats.
Ultimately, the Avangard is a tanglble reminder that Russia and China are America's two primary adversaries. They must be deterred with U.S. military capability and command skill.
Launching from British air force bases on Tuesday, British air force F-35s and Typhoon fighter jets, French air force Rafales, and U.S. Air Force F-15s simulated strike operations against Russian invasion forces.
The exercise, Point Blank, is designed to strengthen NATO interoperability in strike fighter operations. But the primary tactical interest of the exercise is improving NATO's ability to achieve air superiority against powerful air and air defense adversaries. USAF group commander Col. Jason Camiletti explained to British Forces TV that the exercise included "simulated [enemy] surface to air missile sites," to give aircrews experience in a "high-end contested environment that ... we've been lacking in: we haven't had to face over the past couple decades."
But it's clear that the NATO air force contingents are most focused on Russia's highly capable S-400 air defense system. It's a relevant concern in that Russian war planning for an invasion of Europe is focused on a rapid assault to quickly establish strongholds in the Baltic states or Poland. The Russians would then flood those strongholds with long-range missile, artillery, and air defense platforms such as the S-400 in hopes of deterring a NATO counteroffensive. Here, the Russian strategy assumes that NATO states such as Germany and smaller partners like Belgium, Italy, and Spain, would be unwilling to support a counteroffensive, for fear of casualties that might be suffered. In turn, they believe that a rapid knockout blow would encourage NATO to sue for a Russian-favored peace.
Sadly, the Russians might be right in at least part of that assessment: It is notable that Germany did not participate in Point Blank. But Point Blank is manifestly good news. Because the U.S., U.K., and France are willing to fight together, they will ultimately win. And when it comes to specifics, it's pretty clear what the air planners had in mind here. Have a look at my annotated map below:
(Screenshot / Tom Rogan)
The origin points for the blue arrows represent the RAF or USAF fighter-bomber bases in Britain. Not all of them were used in Point Blank, but in the event of a Russian blitzkrieg invasion, the U.S. and U.K. would surge fighter squadrons from these bases in order to defend the Atlantic and North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and NATO forces in the Baltics or Poland. France and other NATO allies would also launch their own air forces.
The red circles represent Russian military strongholds or likely jump-off points for any invasion. But the key circle here is the most central. Because that is Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has spent the past decade turning into a massive fortress. And to degrade or defeat any Russian invasion in its early stages, NATO would have to break, or at least isolate, Kaliningrad. Of course, Putin knows this, and so he has flooded Kaliningrad with S-400s and related systems. That's ultimately why Point Blank is crucial — so that NATO's big three can annihilate Russian forces there, if necessary.
That is not to say that everything is hunky dory with NATO's ability to deter or defeat a Russian invasion. Russian electronic warfare and long-range ground strike capabilities are significant. And while the U.S., Britain, the Baltic states, Poland, and France ( sort of) recognize the threat Putin poses, other NATO allies are less reliable. Germany weakens NATO, and many other members starve their defense budgets. Although slightly improved, Turkey's president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also remains problematic.
Nevertheless, coming on the back of a far larger NATO exercise, Point Blank proves that the major allies are ready to fight and can win.
Top British army general: We must adapt to Russia's growing threat
Britain and NATO have a problem.
That's the assessment of Britain's top army officer, Gen. Nick Carter, who spoke Monday on the transatlantic alliance, supplementing the comments of Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last week.
Carter's argument:
The 40-year officer spoke of a "diversified" and "escalation"-centric Russian approach to war-fighting that enables Putin to launch highly confident operations in Eastern Europe. Carter described Russia's recent ZAPAD military exercise in which its military showed off 150 new weapons and pieces of equipment, and proved its logistical ability to move forces rapidly into and out of different fighting zones.
Yet the general's most interesting focus was his consideration of Russia's highly capable missile platforms. These, he said, have increased in number by a factor of 12 over the past five years, giving Russia the ability to shield vast areas of seized territory from counter-attacking NATO forces. The risk here at the strategic level is that Russia could secure a rapid cease-fire and effective victory in any conflict by making the costs of any counter-offensive too high. In my opinion, Russian strategy seeks to maximize and weaponize any hesitation between different NATO states.
So how does the U.K. intend to counter the challenge?
Well, Carter wants more investment on capable ground-based air defense systems (that could shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft) and in reserve forces and in force logistics capabilities that would allow Britain to push its forces into the fight quickly and more effectively. The chief of the general staff also wants to modernize British military equipment from its tank forces to intelligence and surveillance platforms so that the U.K. can target and destroy strongholds deep in enemy territory.
Carter wants greater policy efforts to counter Kremlin propaganda and separate Western Europe from its present energy reliance on Russian producers. While the general is right here, Germany unfortunately remains disinterested in pushing back against Putin.
The army chief also wants a greater posture of confidence: "Russia respects strength and people who stand up to them." Carter then added an interesting consideration here in that for the Baltic NATO member states, "A platoon of [NATO] infantry is worth a squadron of F-16s when it comes to [showing] commitment." Carter is right: where a platoon is a tripwire that threatens Russia with reflexive escalation from NATO, F-16s offer a capability with weaker symbolism.
Still, Carter warned us not to expect the expected in any Russian attack. Such an attack would be unlikely to involve agent provocateurs of the kind that we witnessed in 2014 Ukraine. Instead, Carter sees the potential for a range of possible activities that do not rise to the obvious condition of an Article 5-level attack on a NATO member state (Article 5 being an attack on a NATO state that requires the alliance's collective response).
Ultimately, while Carter's speech was good, it did have a few slightly disappointing elements. First, the general refused to admit Britain's strategic failures in Helmand province, Afghanistan, and southern Iraq. Second, his focus on updated existing British-made equipment reflects a politically easier but less beneficial alternative to buying better new equipment from foreign nations like the U.S. and Israel. Finally, Carter's call to empower junior officers rings hollow. A British Army friend told me that he was sometimes given only a few rounds during firing exercises while at Britain's Sandhurst military academy!
Russia might be about to invade Europe. Here's how America should respond
Between Sept. 14-20, the Russian armed forces will conduct a major exercise, ZAPAD 2017. Employing forces from various Russian commands, the exercise will test the military's ability to conduct a combined arms offensive. That's exactly the kind of operation Russia would use to invade Europe.
While there's nothing new in the Russians carrying out a military exercise, this situation is different due to the scale and location of the forces involved. Russia claims under 10,000 personnel will be involved but as many as 100,000 Russian soldiers are actually expected to deploy. Their number will include armored and artillery units, and strike fighter aircraft. As interesting, instead of training in Russia, the forces will conduct their exercises in Belarus.
That geographic choice is designed to send a specific message to NATO.
After all, bordering NATO member Poland, Belarus offers ZAPAD forces the means to rapidly strike into the heart of NATO. Joining that threat is the Russian fortress-oblast of Kaliningrad, where reservists have been called up.
Look closely at a map of northern part of eastern Europe, on the shores of the Baltic Sea, and you'll see Kaliningrad — it's a pocket of Russia that doesn't touch Russia, but is instead tucked between Poland and Lithuania. Kaliningrad would be a crucial breaching and supply point for any invasion.
As my map below shows (the red lines exemplify offensive lines), were Russia to invade Poland via Kaliningrad and Belarus, it could encircle Polish forces on that country's eastern front.
The Russians know this and probably believe that they could reach Warsaw before a serious NATO counter-offensive began. While Poland's competent and aggressive military would not yield, it would struggle to withstand a Russian surprise attack by itself.
That said, Poland isn't the only NATO state threatened by ZAPAD; the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania face even greater vulnerability. For a start, Putin has long believed those nations are destined to be feudal states of a new Russian empire. And again, the matching of ZAPAD forces in Belarus to Kaliningrad proves the danger.
Invading the Baltics, Putin could use forces in Kaliningrad and Belarus to block Polish/NATO counter-offensives, as launchpads for a two-front invasion of Lithuania, and as distractions for simultaneous invasions of Latvia and Estonia.
Putin might gamble that if his forces seized significant territory in short order, NATO would sue for peace. His intent would be a limited victory that divided NATO between those pushing for military response, and those, like Germany, who would probably assess a counter-offensive as too risky.
Another complication is that NATO's force disposition against a Russian surprise attack remains weak. While NATO would intercept Russian communications in the immediate buildup to an attack, if those orders were sent from Moscow on short notice, there wouldn't be much NATO could do. In addition, as I've explained, NATO's rapid reaction forces in Europe are patently incapable of defeating a Russian invasion. This is a symptom of Europe's pathetic defense investment, and its consequences in rendering that continent one of largely impotent militaries. Putin also loves the fact that many EU populations oppose their government's support for NATO article 5 treaty obligations. Remember, where Germany leads, other NATO states like Italy and Spain might follow.
All of this demands decisive U.S. leadership.
First, the U.S. must lead reliable NATO allies into defensive action. Britain and France should deploy their respective rapid response forces, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11th Parachute Brigade, into Poland. Simultaneously, Germany and the Netherlands should put their Airborne rapid forces division on short notice standby. The U.S. should deploy the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment's ready reaction battalion to join the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy. These units are orientated to disrupt enemy advances and defend critical targets. The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit ( MEU), now at sea, should also be sent to the Mediterranean. Finally, each capable NATO state should send one fighter or bomber wing to the Baltics or Poland.
Alongside these deployments — which should be made public — Trump should again demand that NATO members speed up their plans to spend 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product on defense. He should state that if they do not, the U.S. will have to relocate major military formations in Europe out of states like Germany and Italy and into 2 percent states like Poland and Britain.
The collective impact of these military and political responses would be twofold: They would show Putin that NATO is prepared to fight and, via the 2 percent push, doubling down on a stronger NATO. Yet these responses would also be measured by their scale and defensive tenor. That matters, because Putin would make great propaganda use out of a massive NATO buildup on his borders. His popularity in Russia rests on the notion that he is a tough leader who protects his nation's pride.
Still, there is one huge variable here: the extent — if any — of Russian influence over President Trump. In recent months, Trump has been evidently reluctant to challenge the Russian leader on a number of key issues. And if Putin believes attacking a NATO state won't incur U.S. military reprisals, he will do so. Trump must avoid equivocation on NATO's Article 5 (an attack on one is an attack on all), as he did while meeting Finland's president on Monday.
In the end, while it is unlikely that Russia is about to invade Europe, that threat cannot be discounted. As Putin's bold and ultimately successful incursion into Syria proved, he is willing to take great risks to boost Russia's power and prestige. We must prepare for the worst.
Congress just delivered a wake-up call to Europe and a painful rebuke to Vladimir Putin
On Wednesday evening, House and Senate negotiators agreed on a deal to send a new sanctions bill to President Trump's desk.
As I explained last month, it's a much overdue piece of legislation that will restrict Russian business interests. It will also prevent foreign businesses, such as those in Europe, from doing business with U.S. entities if they also do business with Russian energy companies. Finally, the legislation prevents Trump from waiving the sanctions (should he irrationally desire to do so). Trump, of course, isn't happy about that, but the bill has veto-proof bipartisan support in the House and Senate.
Yet it's not just Trump and the Russians who are upset.
The French government says the bill is illegal. The European Union says, "America first cannot mean that Europe's interests come last." Germany says the U.S. is acting unfairly.
Some might be surprised by this backlash. Europe, after all, is supposed to be skeptical of Russian President Vladimir Putin's territorial ambitions. And the assumption should be that this legislative crackdown on Russian energy blackmail serves Europe's long-term security.
Such an assessment, however, assumes European nations speak honestly when it comes to Russia and sanctions.
And they do not.
Ultimately, there's a simple reason this legislation is unpopular with Europeans: it takes away the Europeans' ability to have their cake and eat it.
For many years now, the European Union and its constituent member states have talked a big game about breaking their dependence on Russian energy imports. But they've done very little to actually enact that agenda. Indeed, the main Russian energy supplier, Gazprom, is seeing increasing sales to western Europe.
In large part, this failure is due to weak political resolve. E.U. countries want to spend their money on welfare programs, not on defense. As a consequence, Russia's blackmail is more credible and less deterrable. But the failure to break Russia's energy stranglehold is also a result of its earned influence. When I say earned, I mean "bought." Consider that figures as senior as the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder have become rich working with Russian energy companies.
Still, keeping Russia happy is also good for business.
Put simply, European politicians do not want to risk the jobs and tax revenue that go with Russia-related business. As a result, officials happily limit their enforcement of existing sanctions agreements. That's relevant because European businesses are already notorious for sidestepping sanctions regimes. When they know they won't get in serious trouble for doing so, they do it even more.
It's exactly for this reason the U.S. legislation is so important. Taking on European collaboration with Russia, the legislation does what hasn't been done before. The Europeans know this and that's why they are so upset. They know the economic relationships European banks and businesses hold with the U.S. are far more valuable than their deals with Russia. As such, those businesses will grudglingly abandon their Russian dealings.
Realpolitik has returned to Europe.
In turn, this legislation is a big challenge to Putin. If he loses his claws into Europe, his ability to consolidate his long-term energy hold over the continent will decline. As the Washington Examinernoted during President Trump's recent trip to Warsaw, scuttling Nord Stream II should be a key U.S. foreign policy priority. The U.S. must also ensure that our energy exporters are able to supply the European market without delay.
Regardless, this is a good day for U.S. policy and Europe's future security.
The French might call this budding law illegal, but I call it innovative statecraft.
